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Reviewer #1: The article is very interesting and offers new philosophical insights on a topical subject as 
judicial interpretation of international law and the role of international courts. 
My observations are the following:  
Page 1 - Footnote 4: the correct title seems to be "The Global Spread of European Style INTERNATIONAL 
Courts" 
We have made the necessary correction. Thanks. 
Page 2 - lines 4-9: the dynamic interpretation of treaties is explored to a considerable extent in 
international law scholarship and  there are a few important contributions that could be mentioned, first of 
all the articles by Malgosia Fitzmaurice:  "Dynamic (Evolutive) Interpretation of Treaties, Part I", 21 Hague 
Yearbook of International Law (2008), pp. 101-153; Id., "Dynamic (Evolutive) Interpretation of Treaties, Part 
II", 22 Hague Yearbook of International Law (2009), pp. 3-31  
These are helpful suggestions that we have incorporated. Thanks. 
 
Page 2 -line 30: why does the author employ the term "member states"?  Maybe he refers in general to 
members of the international community at large, but it is not clear. This would make an international 
lawyer think immediately to some international organization or other inter-state consortium involved in the 
discourse. 
The term “member states” is used to reflect that states are still the predominant context for identifying the 
relevant social, cultural and economic developments, which feed into the interpretive practices of 
international courts. While these developments will usually only impact on interpretation, when those 
developments are widespread (i.e. cover more states), member states usually form the context for 
identifying those developments. To avoid the potential for misunderstanding that is referred to by the 
reviewer, we have decided to refer instead to “the societies that are subject to the IL in question”. And 
have modified the following sentence to more clearly express our main point: “Consequently IL is now 
being shaped by a continuously evolving case law which is sensitive to underlying social, cultural and 
economic development, which undoubtedly leads ICs to make decisions on issues that would not have 
arisen under a ‘static’ model”. 
Page 6 - line 4 "means by which we which distinguish": is the second "which" superfluous? 
Yes – a clear typo, which we have now corrected. Thanks.  
Page 14 - lines 41-43: it seems to me that it is rather unusual to use the term "contract" to refer to 
international treaties- it might be deceptive inasmuch as States conclude contracts with private subjects 
The term was selected to refer back to the “Pacta Sunt Servanda” paradigm we described at the beginning 
of the article. The context should explain that we do not mean for the word “contracts” to refer to 
contracts involving private parties. The term is supposed to reflect that in the absence of a universal 
international authority that can operate as a legislator and thereby create obligations for states, states are 
Response to Reviews
only subject to obligations that they create for themselves through treaty making. We compare this treaty 
making to the making of a contract. Since we use “treaties” in brackets immediately after contracts, we do 
not think that misunderstanding is likely to happen, but in light of the reviewers comments we have 
decided to replace “contracts” with “agreements” 
Page 22 - line 51: "train" is repeated twice  
Now corrected 
Page 23 - line 38: maybe the expression "against their state" is a bit too restrictive, unless it serves a 
specific intention on the part of the author. As he certainly knows, the Strasbourg court also examines 
cases brought by individuals against states different from the applicant's national state (not to mention 
cases brought by one state against another party to the convention)  
Thank you for this pertinent observation. There was no intention to use this restrictive language. Sentence 
now reads:  
“Whereas the ECTHR adjudicates cases between states and individuals who claim that their human rights 
have been violated, the ICTY adjudicates criminal cases against individuals.” 
 
Two further general observations: 
1. as to the law-making role of the Strasbourg Court, the author mentions LGBT rights, however the 
extensive and evolutive interpretation of the European Convention, according to its nature of 
"living instrument", can be referred to several other topics, as for example all bioethical sensitive 
issues which have gained prominence in recent years 
 
We certainly agree with this, and LGBT rights is used only as an illustration of the dynamic that is 
introduced to the law in this area by the Court. We mention a few other examples on p. 13. To be 
clear we have now added a footnote where we introduce the issue of LGBT rights, which makes it 
clear that this serves as an illustration only, and that other illustrations could be found.  
 
2. concerning legal reasoning and morality, I would like to highlight the existence of authoritative 
cases where international courts rely on a rather limited and politically oriented interpretation of 
custom and opinio juris. In so doing they declare what the law in force is without taking in the least 
consideration the relevant moral issues, or to say with the author without blending "moral 
assessment … into source-based argument" (page 3 - line 37). A recent example in point is the 
judgment delivered by the ICJ on 3 February 2012 in the dispute concerning the "Jurisdictional 
immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy)" where the Court reconstructed the scope of the 
customary rule on sovereign immunity in contrast with all moral considerations concerning the 
right of victims of war crimes to effective judicial protection and redress. This was indeed perceived 
as a bad decision which was the object of harsh criticism, since the Court was accused of having 
been too legalistic and mechanical in its assessment of international practice (as the author says at 
page 8 - line 42-44). All this notwithstanding the ICJ has long been recognized as one of the most 
authoritative law-making courts (Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the 
International Court (1982); Robert Y. Jennings, "The Role of the International Court of Justice", 68 
British Yearbook of International Law (1997) pp. 1-63; Stephen M. Schwebel, "The Contribution of 
the International Court of Justice to the Development of International Law", in W.P.Heere (ed.), 
International Law and the Hague's 75th Anniversary (1999) pp. 405-416.) 
 
This comment is quite general and not addressed at any specific part of the article. Furthermore the issue 
addressed in the comment is quite complex, and we agree with most observations. We would perhaps add 
that even though a court does not explicitly address the moral issues that are affected by a given decision 
by that court, it does not mean that the moral issue has not been made the object of consideration. Not 
every consideration that plays a part in the deliberation process finds its way to the formal decision that is 
being published by the court. Furthermore, we think there is a distinction to be made between the moral 
issues raised by the particular circumstances of the particular case on the one hand, and the moral issues 
raised by the institutional issues related to the Courts legitimacy and the processes of identifying the best 
interpretation of the relevant laws to be applied to the case. In the Germany vs. Italy example mentioned 
by the reviewer, what appears as a legalistic decision that shows no consideration for the moral importance 
of redress for victims of war, may well be the result of Gauging the implications of not respecting sovereign 
immunity in situations where redress relates to incidents that happened 70 years ago, and where The 
ECtHR had already ruled on the case (in favour of Germany) and finding those implication morally 
problematic in that it could potentially destabilize international relations if similar kinds of intrusion into 
sovereign immunity were allowed more generally. Hence what may appear as insensitivity to the rights of 
victims of war is really the result of a moral balancing of this right against the moral importance of not 
risking to destabilize international relations more generally. Thus while we appreciate the comment, we do 
not think that the article allows for further elaboration on this complex issue. 
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1. The Phenomenon of Judicialised  International Law 
Over the past couple of decades, one of the most important 
transformational processes in law and society has been the 
significantly increased importance attached to international 
law
1
 An important but academically neglected development in 
this process is the intensified juridification of international 
relations by a steady growing population of International 
Courts (ICs).
2
 Nearly 90 per cent of the total IC output of legal 
decisions has been issued over the last two decades,
3
 and ICs 
are simultaneously gaining more autonomy from nation states: 
more have compulsory jurisdiction, many allow agents other 
than states to initiate litigation before them, and several have 
the authority to review state compliance with international 
rules.
4
 This development could be summed up as  a move 
towards a new form of  judicialised International Law that 
heralds a change not only in the role of International Law in 
(international) society, but also, and more importantly for our 
purposes,  in the nature of International Law itself. The 
essential feature of this transformational process is to be found 
in the shift from what might be called a pacta sunt servanda 
regime of contractual relations between sovereign states (i.e. a 
regime in which Courts make decisions in disputes between 
parties in relation to the provisions of a treaty), to a more 
dynamic and self-sustaining regime of ‘living law’ (in which 
courts interpret treaties as legal principles that have a more 
general role in preserving and promoting a well functioning  
international community).
5
 
                                                          
1
 e.g., A. M. Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004). 
2
 cf. C.P.R. Romano “The Proliferation of International Tribunals: Piecing 
together the Puzzle”. NYU Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 
31, No. 4, (1999) pp. 709-51; and “A Taxonomy of International Rule of 
Law Institutions”. International  Dispute Settlement, Vol. 2 (2011). See also 
Shany, Y. The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and 
Tribunals (OUP, 2004). 
3
 Karen Alter, “The New International Courts: A Bird’s Eye View”. Buffett 
Centre for International and Comparative Studies Working Paper Series, 
Vol. 09, No. 001 (2009) pp. 1-46. 
4
 Karen Alter, “The Global Spread of European Style International Courts”. 
West European Politics.  Volume 35, Number 1 (2012) pp.  135-154. 
5
 The literature surrounding the transformation of international law is 
considerable. Importantly, we note the contributions of: Klabbers, J. Peters, 
A. and  Ulfstein, G. (2009); Koskenniemi, M. (2007); Dunoff, J.L. and 
*Revised Manuscript
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This dynamism
6
 heralds a change in approach whereby ICs 
participate actively in developing the law.
7
 These developments 
might also be explained in terms of a shift from static 
international law to a more organic process. Ideal-typically, 
static IL can be seen as  comprising a thin background of jus 
cogens supplemented by treaties (bilateral and multilateral) 
fixing  precise legal obligations between states, and expressed 
through a  court system with one general court (ICJ) and 
perhaps several specialized courts with voluntary jurisdiction 
and  ad hoc judges. Organic IL, however, although similarly 
characterized by a background of jus cogens, supplemented by 
treaties, now develops an added layer of case law that 
continuously interprets these treaty texts dynamically so as to 
reflect the underlying social, cultural and economic 
development, in the societies that are subject to the IL in 
question. Simultaneously, increased access to ICs by litigants 
other than states adds new forms of input to the decision 
making process. This development undoubtedly leads ICs to 
make decisions on issues that would not have arisen under a 
‘static’ model. 
The tendency to increased juridification and legalisation noted 
above arises naturally from increasing resort to law as a means 
to both conflict resolution and conflict prevention. This 
straightforward relationship has, however, complex 
undercurrents, three of which should be noted here as a prelude 
to our more specific concern with contemporary approaches to 
judicial reasoning in International Criminal Law
8
. The first 
                                                                                                                           
Trachtman, J.P. (eds.) Ruling the (2009) Koskenniemi M. World? 
Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009) and most recently, Cassese, A  Realizing 
Utopia (OUP 2012). 
6
 The dynamic interpretation of treaties is explored to a considerable extent 
in international law scholarship. An important contribution in this respect is 
Malgosia Fitzmaurice:  "Dynamic (Evolutive) Interpretation of Treaties, 
Part I", 21 Hague Yearbook of International Law (2008), pp. 101-153; and 
"Dynamic (Evolutive) Interpretation of Treaties, Part II", 22 Hague 
Yearbook of International Law (2009), pp. 3-31. 
7
 We might note that an IC such as  ECtHR, is, of course, far removed from 
the pacta sunt servanda paradigm, rather, the practices of this court would  
serve as an illustrative example of what we have in mind. Similarly, 
International Criminal Law has never been understood as part of the pacta 
sunt servanda paradigm; The ICL, however, already served as the 
paradigmatic example for W. Friedman to speak of “the changing structure 
of International Law” in the 1970s. Hence, we might observe two distinct 
but related related trends: (i), a move beyond the pacta sunt servanda 
paradigm and (ii), the increased development of the law by ICs - i.e., 
judicial activism. We are grateful to Ingo Venzke for this important 
observation. 
8
 These three dimensions have been identified in the work of Mikael Rask 
Madsen where he explains the emergence and transformation of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) following three interdependent 
social, legal and political processes: the institutionalisation,  autonomisation 
and legitimisation of the ECtHR. See for example, M. R. Madsen, “The 
Protracted Institutionalisation of the Strasbourg Court: From Legal 
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concerns the organisational/ institutional arrangements relating 
to the social, economic and political conditions conducive to 
the emergence and continued existence and operation of 
International Courts. The second concerns the formal and 
specific legal mechanisms and strategies through which 
International Courts have developed the law and carved out 
their role and function in International Law and International 
Relations. A third aspect relates to questions of legitimation: 
How do International Courts create legitimacy? Through what 
social processes is legitimacy imputed to ICs? How do ICs 
handle crises in legitimacy or, as a daily concern, how do they 
avoid such crises? It is on this latter point that our thinking 
must become as dynamic and agile as contemporary 
International Law itself. For although it is sensible to regard 
legitimacy as a by-product of legality, it would, we suggest, be 
a mistake to assume that legitimacy only follows the static 
conception of international legality
9
. This latter conception, we 
argue, is often unreflectively reliant upon an under-theorised 
notion of ‘source’ as a basis for conceptions of legality that is 
now rapidly being superseded by the need of ICs to respond to 
ever more complex fact situations and an ever expanding 
corpus of relevant legal material (sources). The present 
situation for ICs – at least for the more specialised and prolific 
ones - is now such, we contend, that the decision making 
processes are so complex that moral assessment blend into 
source-based arguments. An understanding of how this blended 
reasoning operates will allow for a deeper insight into how ICs 
create and manage the legitimacy in their position as 
institutionalised operators of the International Law that falls 
under their jurisdiction. In what follows, we shall draw on both 
history and theory in an attempt to provide a clearer 
understanding of this phenomenon.  
 
2. Judicialisation and Autonomy 
A great deal of Legal Theory emphasises the autonomy of law 
to explain two key aspects of legal order as opposed to other 
forms of social normativity. One aspect is the distinctness of a 
legal rationality (i.e. an allegedly special type of justificatory 
reasoning); the other is its place in society as normatively 
dominant or supreme (by which theorists refer to the ‘pre-
                                                                                                                           
Diplomacy to Integrationist Jurisprudence” In. Madsen, M. R and 
Christoffersen, J. (eds.) The European Court of Human Rights Between Law 
and Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 43-60;  Also 
Madsen, M. R. “Legal Diplomacy - Law, Politics and the Genesis of Post-
War European Human Rights”, in  Hoffmann S. L. (ed.), Human Rights in 
the Twentieth Century: A Critical History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), pp. 62-81.  
9
 Recent contributions in the  Philosophy of International Law supports this, 
See. e.g. Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (Eds.)  The Philosophy of 
International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) and especially 
the contributions by Besson (Ch. 7) and Paulus (Ch. 9).  
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emptive’ and ‘exclusionary’ quality of legal norms). Some of 
the most influential Legal Theory construes in effect a 
conceptual strategy for comprehending these essential products 
of the autonomy of law.
10
 More often than not this body of 
theory uses national constitutional orders (implicitly or 
explicitly) as primary reference points for its conceptual 
inquiries and focuses on the extent to which it is possible to 
identify what the law of a given jurisdiction is without resort to 
free-standing moral or political reason
11
.  It is important that we 
attend to this strand of jurisprudential work, although the 
critical account of the significance of the autonomisation 
processes that we shall offer presently does not endorse the 
accepted conceptual separation of law from morality (or 
economy, or politics, or psychology). Instead, we propose a 
framework of ideas that will allow us to discern, articulate 
theoretically, and point empirically to the processes by which 
legal agents (in casu International Courts / judges) develop the 
law through adjudicative practices in such a way as to make the 
entire corpus of doctrine more case-law dependent. It is 
through this largely interpretive activity that international 
courts enhance their own role in the field of international law 
and governance
12
.  The focus of the inquiry, then, will be to 
examine the way ICs administer their role in the field of 
international law and governance and to identify the matrix in 
which this administration takes place. Orthodox jurisprudential 
scholarship provides a useful point of departure for the inquiry. 
Gerald Postema presents the perhaps most detailed and 
comprehensive account of law’s autonomy13 by way of three 
interrelated theses: 
(i) The Limited Domain Thesis  
                                                          
10
 For an initial guide to the theory see, or example, the collection of essays 
in Robert P. George (Ed.) The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal 
Positivism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
11
 Hart’s ‘Rule of Recognition’ is a classic example. See, for example, Hart 
HLA The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law Series, Oxford University Press, 
3rd Edition 2012) pp 94-96 and compare his analysis of International Law at 
pp. 213-23. Similarly, Ronald Dworkin, although a critic of Legal 
Positivism, has developed his legal theory specifically in relation to the 
American Legal System (see Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire. (Fontana 
Press, 1986). Kelsen’s notion of the ‘Basic Norm’ or Grundnorm can in 
principle be applied to both national and international law. See importantly 
Hans Kelsen, (a) (1966) Principles of International Law ( R. W. Ticker Ed.,  
Holt, Rhinehart and Winston Inc. , John Hopkins University Press, 1966)   
pp. 177, 178. 
12
 For a recent contribution to understanding this phenomenon, see Ingo 
Venzke How Interpretation Makes International Law: On Semantic Change 
and Normative Twists. (Oxford University  Press, 2012) Chapter 2. 
Importantly, see also, in this Special Issue: Matwijkiw Anja and Matwijkiw 
Bronik, "Stakeholder Theory: The Philosophical Advantages and 
Disadvantages for International Criminal Law". 
13
 Gerald J. Postema, 'Law's Autonomy and Public Practical Reason', in 
Robert P. George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
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Postema says that law defines a limited domain of practical 
reasons or norms for use by officials and citizens alike. Law 
cannot operate as a specialized and specified normative field 
without some form of delimitation between the legal and the 
non-legal. Law, in other words must be perceived as a 
delimited normative field, where the (pre-emptive and 
exclusionary) norms of law and the negative sanctions attached 
to them for non-compliance are valid only if they 
characteristically belong to the domain. One important way of 
delimiting the domain is codify and   list the posited sources 
that define law’s limited domain. This is reflected in the 
‘Sources Thesis’. 
(ii) The Sources Thesis 
This thesis holds that normative membership in law’s limited 
domain is determined by criteria which are defined exclusively 
in terms of non-evaluative matters of social fact (about their 
sources), such that the existence and content of member norms 
can be determined entirely without appeal to moral or 
evaluative argument. Legality is then clearly tied to positivity 
in that positivity is necessary to maintain the coherence of the 
limited domain thesis. In turn, the limited domain becomes 
simultaneously the referent of the legal and the means by which 
we distinguish the legal from the non-legal. But limiting the 
domain in terms of  positivity in this way is not sufficient – one 
more element is required to assure autonomy in the analytical 
sense. 
 
(iii) The Pre-Emption Thesis 
 Rules in Law’s limited domain operate as ‘pre-emptive’ and 
‘exclusionary’ reasons for action. This is perhaps best 
understood by way of Raz’s concept of the ‘normal 
justification’ of authority.  That is, even where legal rules (and 
an account of obligation in respect of them) are superfluous in 
the sense that a reasonable person would act in accordance with 
them on their own common-sensical volitions, legal rules give 
practical reasons for action which pre-empt ordinary choices of 
action and which preclude other reasons for action. Thus, for 
example, choosing a convenient parking place is pre-empted by 
designated parking areas and restrictions, and reasons falling 
outside the domain (for example, parking on double yellow 
lines because you are in a hurry to get home to watch sport on 
TV) is excluded. In this way, rules within the limited domain 
are distinguished from norms outside of the domain - even 
when they coincide in content, purpose and practical rationale.   
These three interrelated theses express the core notion of 
legality – it’s exclusionary character vis á vis other normative 
domains (morality, politics, religion, etc.) It remains clear 
however, that this artificial notion of autonomy cannot fully 
grasp the over-lapping normative complexity of any viable, 
modern socio-economic formation. Law’s autonomy is only 
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relative and the Autonomy Thesis cannot explain legal practice 
in its totality.  Postema, of course, is fully aware of this, and he 
points out that the AT needs to be embedded in an institutional 
context. This is because the norms that are identified by the 
‘sources thesis’ 
 
     … are authoritatively interpreted and applied, and the 
system of norms is maintained, by adjudicative 
institutions. Moreover adjudicative institutions are 
authorized to settle issues left unsettled by the set of 
source based legal norms available at any point in time. 
Since, in such cases, by hypothesis, the existing legal 
considerations are silent, indeterminate, or in conflict, the 
Court’ setting of them is determined not by appeal to the 
law, but by appeal to considerations outside its limited 
domain. [Emphasis added]
 14
 
 
3. From the ‘Limited Domain’   to   ‘Transformative 
Dynamics’  
Legal norms are applied and interpreted by Courts and it is in 
this capacity that there is sometimes scope for Courts to operate 
outside the limited domain. The line between applying, 
interpreting, adjusting, modifying, adapting and altering the law 
is fine: effectively, social normativity is being re-coded 
(transformed) and dynamically (creatively, pragmatically) 
fashioned into legal normativity from material  that exists - or 
might plausibly be purported to exist - both within and without 
the limited domain.  It is in this ‘Grey Zone’ of the law, that the 
matrix of   judicialisation is active. This matrix is the 
transformative and dynamic location wherein Courts map and 
re-code the ‘Grey Zone’ that is the normative area between the 
intra-legal and the extra-legal.  To lay claim to this territory, 
Courts will promote argumentation frameworks that serve as 
platforms for converting Grey Zones into intra-legem zones. In 
so doing, Courts, in their case law, articulate legally what is 
sometimes referred to as judicial politics, i.e. they manufacture 
precedent in the Grey Zone. Effectively, through dynamic 
judicial activity, courts synthesize new law which can be 
absorbed by the pliable framework of doctrine and constituting 
principle behind the existing positive law.  This process of 
dynamic judicialization - contrary to what, in theoretical 
retrospect should appear to us increasingly as the static logical 
ideal of a 'limited domain’ - inevitably must involve   political 
and moral choices. Alec Stone Sweet captures the character of 
this process in his article on the law’s ‘path dependence’. He 
says, 
I assume that judges seek to maximize, in addition to 
private interests, at least two corporate values … First, 
they work to enhance their legitimacy vis-à-vis all 
potential disputants by portraying their own rule-making 
as meaningfully constrained by, and reflecting the current 
                                                          
14 Postema, supra note 12, p. 93. 
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state of, the law. Second, they work to enhance the 
salience of judicial modes of reasoning vis-à-vis disputes 
that may arise in the future. Propagating argumentation 
frameworks allows them to pursue both interests 
simultaneously. Judges may also seek to enact their own 
policy preferences through their decisions. Yet the more 
they do so, the more likely judges will be to attempt to 
hide their policy behaviour in legal doctrine. Once policy 
is packaged as doctrine, it will operate as a constraint on 
future judicial law-making to the extent that doctrine 
narrows the range of arguments and justifications that are 
available to litigators and judges, and to the extent that the 
law is path dependent.
15
 
 
There is, then, an intimate relationship between the precedent-
driven development of law (the process of converting Grey 
Zones into established law) and the production of legitimacy. 
Portraying a legal decision as emerging from within “the law” 
as opposed to being policy led  is more likely to produce the 
desired outcome in the form of clarifying the law and, insofar 
as this is  seen as the operation of the expected and revered 
‘autonomy of law’, it renders the  decision more ‘legitimate’. 
This does not mean, however, and as we shall explain 
presently, that we should hastily accept that the essence of 
legality, and thus of legitimacy is automatically to be located in 
this inner, doctrinal  “packaging” as Stone Sweet has labelled 
it. In fact, if the decision is perceived as a ‘bad’ decision, 
Courts, as the juridico-political aspect of the wider  social, 
economic and cultural process become the focus of criticism 
for being overly 'legalistic' and mechanical in their reasoning. 
This fact of life is simply a reminder that the 'autonomy of law' 
and the idea of a 'limited domain' are merely artificial 
orientations to the infinitely complex flux of competing 
normativities. For as Stone Sweet further points out:  
 
… courts may abandon precedent and start over; they may 
borrow doctrinal materials from other lines of case law 
considered more successful in some way; and the rule of 
incrementalism may be violated by dramatic new 
rulings.
16
 
 
So, whilst case law does produce more depth and complexity in 
legal doctrine by adding to and qualifying existing texts, and 
while cases may be closely interconnected through 
argumentation frameworks, case law remains relatively 
malleable. This is precisely the reason why ‘Law's Empire’ (to 
use  Dworkin’s familiar phrase) can continue to grow. But it is 
important to notice that this growth, even though it takes us 
outside ‘the limited domain’, is never wholly detached from the 
domain. On the contrary – there is a certain sense in which 
                                                          
15
 Martin M Shapiro and Alec Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics, and 
Judicialization (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) p.128. 
16
 Shapiro and Stone Sweet, supra note 14, p.132 
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Courts retain and protect the autonomy of the legal system 
during the exercise of their competence to interpret and apply 
the law to new cases. 
 
The notion of autonomy as applied to international law and 
international organisations (including international courts) 
takes on an added dimension in that legal autonomy is not only 
a matter of separating the legal from the non-legal (the political 
and the moral) – in the context of international law, it becomes 
also a matter of separating the international from the national. 
This means that autonomy as applied to the jurisprudence of 
international courts becomes a rather complex notion, which 
might be quite difficult to contain. To give a sense of this, 
Collins and White provide in their introduction to an edited 
volume dedicated to the exploration of the meaning of 
institutional autonomy for international organisations
17
 a sense 
of what autonomy in international institutions entails at its most 
basic level. In a commentary to the ICJs Reparations decision 
from 1949
18
, they write: 
 
When the Court claimed that “fifty states, representing the 
vast majority of the members of the international 
community, had the capacity … to bring into being an entity 
possessing objective international personality, and not 
merely personality recognized by them alone …”, it clearly 
recognized the impossibility of considering autonomy as 
merely a matter of the internal relations between institution 
and member states. The effect of bringing into being an 
organization such as the UN was that states had created an 
entity which was clearly more than the sum of its separate 
parts – having the ability, in other words, to exercise powers 
which no state could exercise in isolation.” (Collins and 
White, 2011, p.2)  
 
An autonomous international organisation, then, is an 
institutional entity with its own will. In the case of International 
Courts, this will is expressed – of course – through the court’s 
case law. There is then – despite the complexity – a structural 
similarity between IC autonomy vis a vis states and IC 
autonomy vis a vis other forms of normativity. It can be 
maintained therefore, as a general observation of ICs legal 
autonomy, that this autonomy entails that the legal system 
(which the Court is a part), and thereby the autonomy of those 
who perform the functions of this system, do so in a way that is 
not dictated by other sources of power and authority in 
                                                          
17
 Richard Collins and Nigel D. White, International Organizations and the 
Idea of Autonomy: Institutional Independence in the International Legal 
Order (London; New York: Routledge, 2011). 
18
 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 174. 
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(international) social life
19
. While ICs can receive input and 
derive inspiration from such other sources, its case law cannot 
be reduced to being a product of those other sources. ICs are 
autonomous because they operate a system of autonomous 
reasoning. Because of this autonomous reasoning it is not 
possible therefore to deduce computationally (as it were) 
answers to legal problems straight from the norms in the 
limited domain, and therefore one is forced to identify a form 
of reasoning which can operate outside the limited domain - yet 
not be seen as purely political or moral. If the law is 
autonomous, then it’s must be able to define its own terms, and 
sanction the consequences that flow from describing the world 
in these terms. It must be able to identify and welcome 
solutions, trends, examples and analogies from its surrounding 
environment (society) and must be able to respond to these in 
ways that are considered relevant and legitimate. Yet it must do 
so in way that is alert to the inequitable influences and sectional 
interests of the power and status differences that permeate 
social life. This ideal of equitable  neutrality  is for the most 
part unattainable; yet the aspiration to autonomy is rightly 
operative as a functioning telos for the way courts operate. But 
rather than thinking about autonomy as an all–or-nothing 
attribute of a legal system, it would be more productive 
theoretically to focus on the degree to which a legal system or a 
court looks inwardly (to its own extant pronouncements) rather 
than outwardly when generating and developing argumentative 
frameworks. This perspective on judicial activity, in a different 
context, is what animates the American Legal Realist 
distinction between (a detached and ex post facto) ‘formalism’ 
and (a vibrant and responsive) judicial realism. Looking 
‘inwardly’ here, means to attempt to construct answers to legal 
questions through the concepts that inhere in established canons 
of interpretation, and in doctrinal analysis, that seeks to 
establish commonalities and differences between various legal 
categories. In this ‘involutional’ doctrinal process judges over 
time, and by way of a series of cases, will attempt to refine the 
more precise content of legal categories. But it is not so much 
the judicial aspiration to present legal reasoning in line with the 
ideals of law’s autonomy that will lead us astray here, but 
rather, the theoretical idolatry of the myth of static autonomous 
sources – in short, a naive belief that the Kingdom of the 
Limited Domain is a real place. This, essentially, is what Legal 
Realists past and present have rightly identified as a 
disingenuous (unrealistic) ‘formalism’ at work in the 
characterisation of law and the nature of adjudication.
 20
  
 
                                                          
19
 See also John Merrills: ‘International Adjudication and Autonomy’, in: 
Collins and White, supra note 16. 
20
 See Brian Tamanaha: Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of 
Politics in Judging (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
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4. Static and Organic Conceptions of Legality   
Examples of the failure to develop more dynamic and organic 
understandings of legal processes and consequently a failure to 
develop more agile critical concepts are numerous, but the 
ICTY’s analysis of what constitutes a ‘belligerent reprisal’ in 
Kupreškić, and Kuhli and Gunther’s commentary upon it offer 
an apposite illustration of the general problem and a suitable 
platform from which to progress
21
. Before dealing with the 
specific issue in Kupreškić, it will be useful to illustrate the 
problem  at hand with a more general example. 
 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) adjudicates cases 
where there is suspicion that a perpetrator has committed a 
crime against humanity. In this illustration the crime is that of 
murder, and the elements of it are described as follows: 
22
 
 
(i) The perpetrator killed one or more persons. 
(ii) The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against a civilian population. 
(iii) The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or 
intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic 
attack against a civilian population. 
 
The ICC, in cases brought before the court, will seek to define 
more precisely what “part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against a civilian population” means. Clearly, “part of” 
indicates a relationship between a particular perpetrator and a 
group of perpetrators in the sense of connection or 
coordination. “Widespread or systematic attack” indicates that 
                                                          
21
 The following analysis should be seen as a contribution to the ongoing 
debate in ICL theory over the extent to which ICL can and/ or should  
emulate the strict legality requirements familiar to us in  national law. Mark 
Drumbl and Mark Osiel suggest that IL should operate with legality criteria 
that focus more on the extent to which agents might reasonably expect 
impunity for their acts rather than on the formal requirement that only lex 
scripta suffice as a basis for punishing individuals. The recent contribution 
by Darryl Robinson in “A Cosmopolitan Liberal Account of International 
Criminal Law” (Leiden Journal of International Law – forthcoming - 
Electronic copy available at:  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2122926 ) sums up 
the debate so far (see especially section 6.1.) In relation to the analysis 
below we might note especially David Luban’s “Fairness to Rightness: 
Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law” 
(Georgetown Law Faculty Working Papers (2008) - Electronic copy 
available at  SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1154177) – especially sections 
6-8 of this paper.  
22
 ‘The Elements of Crimes’ are reproduced from the Official Records of the 
Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court - First Session, New York, 3-10 September 2002 (United Nations 
Publication, Sales No. E.03.V.2 Part II.B and corrigendum ). ‘The Elements 
of Crimes’ adopted at the 2010 Review Conference are replicated from the 
Official Records of the Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, Kampala, 31 May-11 June 2010 
(International Criminal Court Publication, RC/11). 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
11 
 
murders were somehow planned and premeditated.  Similarly, 
“directed against” means that the attack must have had a more 
or less specific purpose or intention. And, “knew that the 
conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of” 
means that the perpetrator must have been aware of what 
conduct he or she was involved in. 
 
Each of these issues could separately be made the object of a 
doctrinal legal inquiry in which the law would look (inwardly) 
to itself and its own doctrinal canons of construction. In that 
sense, the law and its judges are attempting to “work the law 
pure”. This is not to say that political, ethical, religious, 
economic or other normative standards are neglected or 
ignored. The point is that these other standards become relevant 
only to the extent that they can be articulated legally. But, as 
noted, this form of relevant articulation (i.e. the legal) need not 
be anchored in the inflexible and inorganic understandings of 
the static era of International Law.  On the contrary, just as with 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECTHR), the ICC’s 
activities should be understood in the context of political 
support for more humanitarian forms of government.  
 
The ECTHR has adopted a dynamic approach to Human Rights 
and developments in the case law of the Court must be seen 
against the background of a political will to strive for higher 
humanitarian standards in this regard. This entails recognition 
of the overall support for the court in using its competence to 
decide concrete matters as an instrument for this purpose.
23
  
Hence, the ECTHR has used its case law as an instrument to 
promote, for example, a ban on a specific form of physical 
punishment of children in public schools (Tyrer v. United 
Kingdom); action against prohibition of homosexual activity 
demands on national courts to assure that accused persons 
receive a fair trial in criminal proceedings (Hauschildt v. 
Denmark) and the protection of women’s health in situations 
where abortion was prohibited but where the well-being of the 
mother was threatened by the pregnancy (Tysiac v. Poland). 
The emergence of the ICC and the ICTY; and ICTR should be 
seen in a similar light. That is, the adjudicative institutions of 
International Criminal Law must be seen as products of the 
overall political will to push for higher standards with respect 
to protection of civilian populations in war zones and more 
generally for promoting respect for the laws of war. This means 
that the ICTY cannot be understood simply and literally as an 
ad hoc Tribunal whose only purpose is to make decisions in 
those (random) cases that are brought before it. It is possessed 
of a wider judicial remit whereby standards of law in these 
                                                          
23
 See for example Luzius Wildhaber, ‘The European Court of Human 
Rights in Action’, Ritsumeikan Law Review, Vol. 21 2004. 
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cases are made –and are expected to be made - more specific. 
Whilst we might say that ICL is still in its infancy (compared to 
e.g., International Human Rights Law or International Trade 
Law) there is a widespread consensus that the ICTY has been 
valuably effective in producing usable case-law in this 
respect.
24
 It is perfectly understandable, therefore, that these 
organic achievements have led some commentators to suggest 
that the ICTY has, in some of its rulings, engaged not simply in 
adjudication and application, but in law-making.   
Orthodoxly, this can be seen as operating outside of and 
beyond the traditional domain and functions of Courts. Kuhli 
and Günther rightly suggest that lawmaking “implies the idea 
that courts create normative expectations beyond the individual 
case.”25 This observation makes a familiar distinction between 
discourses of ‘norm justification’ and discourses of ‘norm 
application’. The former is a discourse that is usually assumed 
to be characteristic of legislatures, and concerns the issue of  
what  norms should be issued; the latter concerns the issue of 
how a given rule should be interpreted and  applied to a certain 
set of circumstances  -  usually seen as the business of the 
courts. This distinction however is difficult to maintain,  it is 
superficially plausible in a situation where legislatures are 
operational and capable of engaging in continuous, majoritarian 
decision-making processes.  No such legislature exists in the 
international normative-institutional space that occupies us 
here. Rather, and as we noted in our introductory remarks, the 
paradigmatic perspective up until recently has viewed  
International Law as a creation of agreements  (treaties) 
between states, and the enforcement of these by the ICJ, has 
primarily been a matter of interpreting these agreements 
(treaties). The starting point, then, has not been the existence of 
a regulatory authority with the capacity to legislate for all, but 
rather the opposite: No Rights or Duties existed for any states 
other than by the express   consent of the parties. There has, of 
course, always been a notion of customary law and/ or jus 
cogens, but the purpose of these rules has predominantly been 
to serve as instruments for solving conflicts by upholding the 
foundational principle that no state should be bound by any law 
other than by its own consent. 
 
The historical starting point in International Law, therefore, is 
not the existence of a clear cut divide between legislator and 
judiciary. But, importantly,  historiy shows that the same could 
                                                          
24
 See Schabas (2006) and more recently Schlutter (2010), who in chapter 
five, V (p. 186-259) explicitly addresses “the findings of the ICTY on the 
evolution of new customary international criminal law.. 
25
 Milan Kuhli and Klaus Günther ‘Judicial Lawmaking, Discourse Theory, 
and the ICTY on Belligerent Reprisals’, in von Bogdandy, A. and Venzke, I. 
(Eds) International Judicial Lawmaking. (Springer, 2012) p.365. 
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be said of National Law. Suri Ratnapala says of the situation in 
England in the 17th Century: 
 
Parliament exercised jurisdictio, not as a general 
legislature, but as the highest court. The legislative power 
of Parliament originated from its authority as the supreme 
court to supply a rule of law where no [rule] existed … 
However the infrequence and brevity of parliamentary 
sessions under the Tudors and the emergence of other 
courts provided the major impetus to the conversion of 
Parliament into a mainly legislative organ” 26 
 
In England, then, the ‘Supreme Court’ (Parliament) was 
initially involved in both application and justification. When 
economic and social relations reached a certain level of 
complexity this modus operandi became inadequate and 
parliament evolved into a purely legislative organ. There are 
many parallels between this state of affairs and the political 
situation we see in the contemporary international space. 
Although the political domain is functionally differentiated 
(broadly speaking between trade / economy;  human rights/ 
fundamental rights,  and Criminal Law/ Humanitarian Law) 
and although the international space is not completely devoid 
of legislative-like bodies (e.g., the UN, and various regional 
political corporations), it is accurate to say that courts are today 
operating on premises that resonate more with the  functions of 
the  17th Century English Parliament, than, say, with a 
contemporary Danish (or German) High Court. In light of this, 
whilst the distinction between ‘discourse of application’ and 
‘discourse of justification’ might be a useful heuristic, we 
should be cautious in our reception of it. It does, however, help 
us to articulate the extent to which ‘judicial lawmaking’ might 
be seen as the result of the collapse of our reliance on this 
convenient distinction. Kuhli and Günther’s discussion 
Kupreškić  is particularly revealing in this regard27. 
                                                          
26
 Suri Ratnapala, ‘John Locke’s Doctrine of the Separation of Powers: A 
Re-evaluation’, American Journal of Jurisprudence, no. 38, 1993. p.196 
27
 It should be noted that the Kupreškić  decision on belligerent reprisals has 
been the object of much critique. Schlütter finds the Court’s assessment of 
opinio juris “almost ironic” and she finds the Courts approach “radical” in 
that it is “more or less ignoring the relevant practice of states and orientating 
itself mostly towards the legal views of the ILC, the ICRC and the UNGA.” 
(See p.235.) Schlütters abbreviations refer to: The International Law 
Commission, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United 
Nations General Assembly). Similarly, Martins Paparinskis in The British 
Year Book of International Law 2008 describes the decision as “sweeping” 
and says that “its legal rationale is subject to some doubt” and that   the 
arguments used in the decision are “initially suspect” – see p. 323 -325. 
Kuhli and Günther  then, follow  an already established line of critique that 
has been levelled against this decision. Whilst we are not primarily 
concerned to endorse or condemn the decision per se, we do wish to make 
the case for a methodological approach that can explain how it was possible 
for the ICTY to arrive at their conclusion. That is, to show how the 
judgment on belligerent reprisals (i.e. the arbitrary killing of innocent 
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5. The ICC, ICTY and Kupreškić  
The Kupreškić case was concerned with whether or not an 
armed attack on a small Bosnian village was a violation of the 
law of armed conflict or whether the attack was justified as a 
“belligerent reprisal”.. The focus, therefore, is on how the 
ICTY decided on the issue of whether or not belligerent 
reprisals can be said to be allowed under international 
customary law and hence on whether the Court applied an 
already existing standard; or constructed a new standard? This 
question addresses a key object in general jurisprudence: What 
does it mean to declare what the law is? In the Kupreškić 
Decision, it seems that the law to be applied to the case is clear. 
The court in Para. 536 states:  
 
...it must be noted, with specific regard to the case at 
issue, that whatever the content of the customary rules on 
reprisals, the treaty provisions prohibiting them were in 
any event applicable in the case in dispute. In 1993, both 
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina had ratified 
Additional Protocol I and II, in addition to the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949. Hence, whether or not the 
armed conflict of which the attack on Ahmici formed part 
is regarded as internal, indisputably the parties to the 
conflict were bound by the relevant treaty provisions 
prohibiting reprisals. 
 
Despite what appears to be the identification of existing law on 
the matter, Kuhli and Günther suggest that the ICTY makes law 
in this case. They arrive at this conclusion by focusing on the 
argument developed in previous paragraphs of the decision. 
Here the Tribunal speculates about whether or not the 
prohibition on belligerent reprisals that already exist in treaty 
law could be said to constitute a universal requirement (i.e. 
could be said to exist as customary law). Here is a passage from 
the decision: 28 
 
The question nevertheless arises as to whether these 
provisions, assuming that they were not declaratory of 
customary international law, have subsequently been 
transformed into general rules of international law. In 
other words, are those States which have not ratified the 
First Protocol (which include such countries as the U.S., 
France, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Pakistan and 
Turkey), nevertheless bound by general rules having the 
same purport as those two provisions? Admittedly, there 
does not seem to have emerged recently a body of State 
practice consistently supporting the proposition that one of 
                                                                                                                           
civilians as an instrument of war) is not acceptable under customary 
international law. While we could have addressed the practice of the ICTY 
more generally, perhaps including more case law in our analysis, we have 
instead opted for an approach where the close discussion of  one difficult 
case allows us to  develop a more pointed analysis of the problems at hand. 
28
 Kupreškić, Trial Judgment  p.207-208. 
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the elements of custom, namely usus or diuturnitas has 
taken shape. This is however an area where opinio iuris 
sive necessitatis may play a much greater role than usus, 
as a result of the aforementioned Martens Clause. In the 
light of the way States and courts have implemented it, 
this Clause clearly shows that principles of international 
humanitarian law may emerge through a customary 
process under the pressure of the demands of humanity or 
the dictates of public conscience, even where State 
practice is scant or inconsistent. The other element, in the 
form of opinio necessitatis, crystallising as a result of the 
imperatives of humanity or public conscience, may turn 
out to be the decisive element heralding the emergence of 
a general rule or principle of humanitarian law.  
 
It might be considered superfluous for the ICTY to discuss the 
question of whether or not what is prohibited by applicable 
treaty law is also prohibited as international customary law. 
Why, we might ask, do the ICTY raise this question?  The most 
obvious answer seems to be because the Secretary General of 
the UN in his original report, which contained the draft statute 
for the Tribunal stated: 29  
 
The application of the principle nullum crimen sine lege 
requires that the international tribunal should apply rules 
of international humanitarian law which are beyond any 
doubt part of customary law so that the adherence of some 
but not all States to specific conventions does not arise…  
 
It would seem, therefore, that the Court perceives its function 
and legitimacy as closely related to the possibility of clarifying 
what the status of customary law is.  Kuhli and Günther, 
commenting on the above quote from the Kupreškić case find it 
striking that the Tribunal “… by expressly referring to those 
states, decided the customary law question with a view toward 
possible future cases (involving the United States, France etc.) 
over which the ICTY itself would almost certainly have no 
jurisdiction.”30 This, however, might be a misreading of the 
Tribunal’s intentions. Raising the issue might be seen as a way 
of explaining the weight that is needed to advance the argument 
that the provisions in question are valid law despite not 
receiving explicit support from a number of important states in 
the international community. One could say that the court 
openly addresses the fact that these states may have their 
reasons for not wanting to endorse these provisions as part of 
international law. It would therefore require compelling and 
weighty argument brought to bear on the decision to regard 
these provisions as forming influential part of customary 
international law. 
 
                                                          
29
 Quoted in Kuhli and Günther, supra note 23,  p.369. 
30
 Ibid.  p.376. 
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These influential reasons are laid out in the following part of 
the decision, and the ICTY is quite transparent in this regard: 
opinio juris is what must lift the weight of the argument. 
Congruously, then, we see the ICTY in the following 
paragraphs advert to the various documents that may serve as 
evidence of a universal or widespread opinion. 
31
 But the Court 
also puts forward a broader view of the matter. At para. 528-9 
the Tribunal states that: 
 
 It cannot be denied that reprisals against civilians are 
inherently a barbarous means of seeking compliance with 
international law. The most blatant reason for the 
universal revulsion that usually accompanies reprisals is 
that they may not only be arbitrary but are also not 
directed specifically at the individual authors of the initial 
violation. Reprisals typically are taken in situations where 
the individuals personally responsible for the breach are 
either unknown or out of reach. These retaliatory 
measures are aimed instead at other more vulnerable 
individuals or groups. They are individuals or groups who 
may not even have any degree of solidarity with the 
presumed authors of the initial violation; they may share 
with them only the links of nationality and allegiance to 
the same rulers. 
529.  In addition, the reprisal killing of innocent persons, 
more or less chosen at random, without any requirement 
of guilt or any form of trial, can safely be characterized as 
a blatant infringement of the most fundamental principles 
of human rights. It is difficult to deny that a slow but 
profound transformation of humanitarian law under the 
pervasive influence of human rights has occurred. As a 
result belligerent reprisals against civilians and 
fundamental rights of human beings are absolutely 
inconsistent legal concepts. 
 
Against this background of reasoning, Kuhli and Günther write: 
 
It is striking to note the types of reasons that the ICTY is 
providing here. We hear practical arguments concerning 
the effectiveness of reprisals relative to the effectiveness 
of courts [see para 530 – we do not discuss this issue 
here]. We hear purely moral arguments concerning the 
inhumanity of attacking civilians and civilian objects. 
These are not the kinds of reasons that bear on the task of 
identifying existing international law. They are reasons 
taken from a discourse of norm justification. Effectively 
the ICTY is arguing that customary law in this instance 
should be created. 
32
  
 
One could not find a more straightforward illustration of the 
fetishisation of a doctrinal distinction (between law ‘as it is’ 
and law as it ‘ought to be’).  In international law the distinction 
forces us desperately to invest qualities of permanence and 
pedigree in the notion of custom.  Since Lauterpacht’s 
                                                          
31 See para. 529-535  (including footnotes). 
32 Kuhli and Günther, supra note 23, p. 378, original emphasis. 
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exposition of progressive interpretation, however, this is a 
particularly brittle device, and one that has had tenuous 
purchase for many years.
33
   In moving to a conclusion we will 
argue that this distinction cannot be drawn with any analytical 
clarity, and that rather than imposing a mechanical formula for 
discerning what is customary in international law, we should 
instead be prepared to engage with the normative implications 
that press upon us within what we can call ‘the matrix of 
judicialisation’. By this is meant the historical, moral, 
organisational and political context of international courts at 
work. We may say, with Torben Spaak, that ‘recognising’ or’ 
identifying the empirical  ‘raw material’ of law does not 
automatically reveal  the semantic potential of its normative 
scope.
34
 The Kupreškić case is a profound example of the 
importance of this observation, but the point is more general in 
International Law and can be made in parallel to the ECTHR’s 
case law on LGBT rights. Let us then briefly consider the scope 
of principle involved
35
. 
 
6. Conclusion: Interpretation and Legality in International 
Law  
In a recent study
36
, Larry Helfer and Eric Voeten have shown 
how LGBT rights have become increasingly articulated, 
widened, accepted and integrated in the development of the 
aims of the convention. The various legal issues involved are: 
Decriminalisation of consensual sexual activity in private; 
Equalisation of age of consent for homosexual activity; the 
right to serve openly in the Armed Services; Equal treatment of 
unmarried (and later married) same-sex couples with regard to 
various social rights; Rights associated with gender 
reassignment, Transsexual marriage rights, and Rights to 
gender reassignment. Whilst the case law shows a marked 
development in the recognition of these various rights, the 
convention texts in which these rights are based have remained 
the same.  
 
                                                          
33
 See importantly P. Capps “Lauterpacht’s Method” British Yearbook of 
International Law 2012. 
34
 Spaak says: “the identification of the legal raw material at the level of the 
sources of law is a purely factual matter, whereas the interpretation and 
application of this raw material often involves moral reasoning...” See 
Spaak, Torben “Legal Positivism and the Objectivity of Law.” Annalisi e 
Diritto, Vol. 253, pp. 253-267, 2004. 
35
 The case law on LGBT rights is merely one of a number of examples that 
we could have used as illustration of our point. The extensive and  evolving 
interpretation of the European Convention, according to its nature of "living 
instrument", can be referred to several other topics, as for example a number 
of  bio-ethically  sensitive issues which have gained prominence in recent 
years in  ECtHR jurisprudence. 
36
 Laurence R. Helfer and Erik Voeten, ‘International Courts as Agents of 
Legal Change: Evidence from LGBT Rights in Europe’  International 
Organization, vol. 67 (forthcoming 2013) 
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We are talking particularly about the longstanding articles 8, 12 
and 14; respectively: rights to privacy, rights to marry, and the 
right not to be discriminated against. The ‘raw’ sources of law 
have, then, remained the same for 50 years; yet the perception 
of what that law entails with regards to LGBT rights has 
evolved. Does this mean that ECTHR has developed new law? 
On one interpretation of what that question means, the answer 
would be an obvious ‘Yes’. If, however, one takes as a starting 
point for legal interpretation that which was immediately 
apparent to the consciousness of the representatives that drafted 
the convention texts, then it would be plausible to suggest that 
the purpose of setting out a right to privacy, or a right not to be 
discriminated against, was not intended as an instrument that 
should be used to force member states to condone homosexual 
activity, or for them to formally re-register the sex of post-
operative trans-sexuals.  In fact, Art. 14 does not even list 
sexual orientation as one of the grounds that may give rise to a 
claim of equal treatment: sexual orientation has become 
accepted only as such through the general clause of “other 
status”. When the convention was adopted few would have 
perceived homosexual or trans-sexual activities as envisaged by 
this kind of protection. On this view (i.e. some version of 
Scalia’s  “original intent” thesis),37t he ECTHR ‘makes’ new 
law in these instances. 
 
On a less static view, however, the textual foundation of the 
law is so wide that the protection of these rights can easily be 
seen as covered by the relevant provisions. Organically 
speaking, the law is not (an immediate or unreflective) 
intention frozen in time, but rather, a textual expression of 
moral and social value arising in more or less specific 
circumstances from commitment to a   more or less general 
normative principle. Standards of behaviour that cohere with 
this commitment may demand that previous understandings of 
the scope and application of legal rules are revised and 
developed over time and circumstance.  The law, on this view, 
demands a commitment to the principled social values 
expressed textually, but not a commitment to a fixed historical 
version of what that text should mean. The consequence of this 
is that although the drafters did not have in mind, for example, 
homosexual activity when they drafted Articles 8 and 14, the 
value of respect for the principles underpinning privacy and 
equal treatment are seen as better served if one accepts that 
these activities do indeed fall within the ambit of the textual 
provisions. 
 
In explaining how and why movement between on the on 
ehand, text (as ‘raw material’), and, on the other,  principle (as 
                                                          
37 Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law. 
(Princeton University Press, 1998) 
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the semantic source of binding normative potential), can and 
must vary in magnitude, we need only consider the complexity 
of the matrix of judicialisation alluded to above. Some forms of 
legal regulation are, relatively speaking, semantically and 
normatively precise, that is, they have a more limited and 
focused semantic scope (regulation of pension age can be seen 
as an example of this). Others, as illustrated in Kupreškić and in 
our Human Rights examples, are more open.  In both cases, the 
law operates as a form of adjustment mechanism, the function 
of which is to co-ordinate action in the public sphere.
38
  If we 
imagine legal rules functioning in socially co-ordinatory  and 
regulatory terms as bumpers or shock absorbers, legal texts that 
appear specific and detailed express a higher level of consensus 
and/ or a need for close co-ordination of action. Conversely, 
wider constructive interpretation responds to more expansive 
problems. One might imagine the two contrasting contexts of 
co-ordinatory action in terms of, on the one hand, and for 
example, the tightly constrained proximities of the individual 
wagons on a high speed train, as opposed, on the other, to the 
looser and more unpredictable relations between automobiles 
on roads and motorways. Co-ordination takes place in both 
cases, but where there is little room for manoeuver (as with the 
individual wagons of a high-speed train) shock absorption is 
short, sure, unilinear and homogeneous. Employing this 
metaphor, we can say that, when the ECTHR, for example, uses 
its interpretive discretion to say that LGBT rights are protected 
by the convention, they adapt to the more expansive co-
ordinatory context that is available to them; that is, they 
become sensitive to the more diverse trajectories of more 
subtlely responsive, slower moving vehicles on wider roads and 
motorways. Precisely because there is such a scope for 
interpretive manoeuver, the ECTHR has a more onerous 
responsibility with regards to the co-ordinatory effect of its 
rulings. The Court itself is aware of this. In a decision from 
2003 (Karner v. Austria), the Court says that, it “determine[es] 
issues on public-policy grounds in the common interest …”, 
thereby signalling the aim of building public consensus in 
legitimising support for  their interpretive strategies. 
 
This being said, there are obvious differences between the 
ICTY and the ECTHR. The ECTHR has a much longer history, 
has rendered more decisions, operates on the basis of treaty 
text, has a permanent existence, a much wider jurisdiction and 
so on.  Yet there are also obvious similarities. Both Courts are 
international courts situated in Europe, both courts are assigned 
cases that relate to basic moral issues (i.e. human rights / 
humanitarian law), and both Courts were created as a response 
to war time atrocities.   It is plausible to assume, therefore, that 
                                                          
38
 See Postema, supra note 12. 
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some of the same mechanisms that one finds in the ECTHR’s 
approach case law might also be common to the ICTY. One 
difference, however, should perhaps be singled out: Whereas 
the ECTHR adjudicates cases between states and individuals 
who claim that their rights have been violated, the ICTY 
adjudicates criminal cases against individuals.  
The ECTHR can pronounce that a state acts in contravention of 
the convention – the ICTY can send an accused individual to 
prison. This difference is important – and it stresses the 
important role in all ICTY case law of nullum crimen sine 
legem, a principle which is also set out in the ECHR, art 7. 
Insisting statically on the observance of this maxim threatens to 
return us to square one, but this need not be so. 
 
What is it that gives a certain decision its legal character?  
Faced with this question the positivist’s ‘source thesis’ stands 
out as particularly attractive: If normative membership in law’s 
limited domain is determined by criteria which are defined 
exclusively in terms of non-evaluative matters of social fact, 
then it will be a morally-neutral endeavour to identify what the 
law is. Driven by a demand for positive identifiability it 
appears to be possible, by detaching the legal from issues of 
morality and politics, to make legal judgments on the basis of 
simple empirical facts. The rationale for this approach, 
paradoxically, suggests a moral advantage in serving the Rule 
of Law in that classically, this detachment equates to the liberal 
assurance that the state apparatus does not use its power 
arbitrarily.
39
 But, as we have seen in our lengthy examination 
of the concept of law’s autonomy, the problem is that 
methodologically, it is simply not possible to avoid an overlap 
between law and morality. Thus, whilst there are good reasons 
to distinguish between instances of law-making and law 
application, and while law-making can  be entirely legitimate 
(as Kuhli and Günther  concede), it might be worth considering 
whether the process of identifying what the law is involves 
value judgments of the kind Kuhli and Günther seem to 
dismiss.
40
 
 
The legal matter before the court in Kupreškić asks if it is 
possible to identify sufficient support for a prohibition against 
belligerent reprisals in customary law. The ICTY recognised 
that there was not sufficient evidence in the form an existent 
and consistent state practice to support the view that belligerent 
reprisals are illegal. But they then argued that customary law 
might be identified through a study of the opinio juris of state 
agents. Whilst customary law usually requires that both the 
                                                          
39
 For a good exposition, see H.L.A.  Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of 
Law and Morals’ The Harvard Law Review, vol. 71, No. 4, 1958. pp.593-
629. 
40
  See Kuhli and Günther. supra  note 18, p.378.  
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conditions of usus and opinio be met, in this type of case 
(where usus is more a matter of refraining from engaging in 
certain activities) opinio plays a much greater role in 
establishing the foundation of law on the issue. To identify 
what the law is, therefore, it is necessary to undertake an 
inquiry into what relevant agents take the law to be. In so 
doing, one cannot rely on a criterion of absolute consensus - 
one must allow, critically, for the possibility that some agents 
reason perversely. It is necessary, therefore, to operationalise 
criteria for sifting the central and correct conceptualisations of 
the legal duty from the peripheral and diluted understandings –
and, in turn, these diluted  understandings  from the plain 
wrong understandings of the requirements of international law 
with  regard, in this case,  to belligerent reprisals.
41
  To identify 
what the law is, one must,  in other words,  engage in an 
interpretive exercise to what both Lauterpacht and Dworkin see 
as ‘Constructive Interpretation’. For Lauterpacht, this requires a 
construction of  an image of what international law is for and 
what values it serves. In answering these meta-legal questions, 
law must stand up and be counted as to what, precisely, are its 
identifiable normative orientations. Customary authorities are 
not, then, to be seen as static empirical objects but rather, ideal-
typical reconstructions of existing practices viewed in the best 
possible light. They are judgments about what  best  appears  to 
justify the overall enterprise of having a system of international 
rights and duties that impose limitations on the freedom of 
individuals and states. Hence, if a tribunal engages in 
normative discourse - as did the ICTY in Kupreškić case - one 
should not necessarily, as Kuhli and Günther suggest, perceive 
this as an instance of ad hoc law-making. Rather, this judicial 
activity is more accurately rendered as an attempt to serve the 
often unattainable ideals of law’s autonomy by showing 
publicly and transparently how the court arrives at their 
conclusions about what the law is.
42
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
41
 See John Finnis Natural Law and Natural Rights. (The  Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1980 Chapter 1. 
42
 See H. P. Olsen and S. Toddington Law in its Own  Right  (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 1999) Chapter 1. Here we give an account of the way legality is 
located in a ‘continuum of practical reason’ and strives to produce 
legitimacy in a  process of ‘transparent autonomy’. 
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